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DESERT STORM: A JUST WAR ANALYSIS
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN*

I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUST WAR DOCTRINE: COMPLEMENTS
AND ALTERNATIVES

In the contemporary era, awareness in the United States of
the need to impose normative restraints on armed conflict has increased markedly. This awareness has been reflected, particularly
since the Vietnam War, in the efforts of the U.S. government to
comply with existing international law governing recourse to armed
force and the conduct of military operations.' However, the task of
interpreting and applying international law in the contemporary
international system has been difficult. One reason for this difficulty is that international law is developed in part by an examination of "the practice of states."2 This examination has become increasingly more difficult as the system of states has grown from
about fifty to over 150 heterogeneous states. In the case of the international law of war, an additional difficulty has been to relate
the law to the daunting spectrum of possible uses of force ranging
from nuclear deterrence to low intensity conflict in revolutionary
and/or counterinsurgency wars.
Awareness of the limits of modern international law has
helped bring about a revival of just war doctrine. At first the just
war literature tended to concentrate on the dilemmas of nuclear
deterrence and defense. Soon, however, the Vietnam War attracted
just war analysts as the debates over war became increasingly concerned with moral as well as legal issues. By the end of the Vietnam War, it was clear to the American government and military
that future military preparations, commitments, and operations
* Professor of Government, Georgetown University. Professor O'Brien is the author of
The Conduct of Just and Limited War (1981) and Law and Morality in Israel's War with
the PLO (1991).
' See WMLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LimTED WAR 308-14 (1981) (discussing American efforts to comply with rules of engagement during Vietnam War).
2 JANMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
"Custom" is an established source of international law; it is found "only by examining the
practice of states." Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:797

would have to be justified to the country both in legal and in moral
terms.'
The result has been an increasing trend towards recourse to
just war analyses of national security measures, either as complements to or as substitutes for international legal analyses. Although substantial overlaps exist between the international law of
war and modern just war doctrine, two major differences should be
recognized. First, international law has traditionally been based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of states.4 All states,
whether they could be judged to be good or bad by some standard,
had the same rights and duties. Accordingly, the war-decision law
governing recourse to armed force does not admit distinctions between states until one breaks the "no first use of force" rule embodied in article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. 5 Similarly,

international war-decision law tends to insist on an absolute principle of non-intervention and resists efforts to justify interventions
that purport to be morally enjoined." International war-conduct
law, likewise, emphasizes the equality of all belligerents, however
apparently good or bad they might be, and purports to govern the
conduct of war through universal rules applied irrespective of the
stakes or circumstances of the conflict. Just war doctrine, on the
other hand, recognizes the need for comprehensive evaluation of
the ends and means of war in the specific context of each conflict.
In so doing, just war doctrine goes beyond the "no first use of
armed force" and "non-intervention" principles of international
law and provides a much more complex framework for war-decision law. At the same time, just war doctrine actually imposes potentially greater limits on war-conduct than international law.
Rather than a sharp separation of war-decision and war-conduct
law, just war doctrine brings them together in a comprehensive an' See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (citing modern just war analysts).
' See BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 130-33 (discussing doctrine of equality of states).

' U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. Article 2, paragraph 4 provides that "[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations." Id. The only permissible forms of armed coercion
allowed under the United Nations Charter are enforcement actions ordered by the Security
Council in cases of breaches of the peace, id. art. 42, and individual and collective selfdefense measures taken "if an armed attack occurs." Id. art. 51.
' See BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 402-03. Intervention refers to the "dictatorial interference in the domestic or foreign affairs of another state which impairs that state's independence." Id. at 402. Since intervention violates another state's sovereignty, it is considered
contrary to international law. Id.
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alytical framework. Just war analysis thus requires the reconciliation of war-conduct with the just cause claimed in the war decision. Accordingly, a military action may be legally permissible but
not morally permissible if it conflicts substantially with the overall
purposes of the just war.
The second important difference between the international
law of war and modern just war doctrine lies in the basis of obligation for complying with these two sources of normative regulation.
Among the many jurisprudential theories that touch upon the basis of obligation in international law,7 it is fair to say that in the
contemporary era the most cited basis for obligation is the explicit
and/or implicit consent of states to obey the principles and prescriptions generally accepted by the majority of states.8 These
principles and prescriptions are found in the primary sources of
international law, namely, international conventions and custom
and general principles of law held by civilized nations. Also, they
may be ascertained to some extent from the decisions of international and national tribunals and the writings of publicists.9 This
basis of obligation, however, is vulnerable. In an international system containing numerous and diverse actors, states may dissent
from the apparent general consensus and refuse to submit to
widely accepted international legal prescriptions.
Just war doctrine, on the other hand, does not depend upon
consensus among states-although it would welcome consensus. Indeed, just war doctrine, particularly those versions produced by official Catholic sources, is at great pains to include and promote international law in its elaboration of restraints on use of force. But
the basis of obligation for just war doctrine is moral. Just war doctrine was developed to guide consciences, not only of individuals
but indeed of whole sociopolitical entities.
Just war doctrine is intended to guide the consciences of political and military decision-makers, of those who implement decisions, and of ordinary citizens. It is also intended to guide the collective or corporative consciences of nations. Thus, the basis for
obligation is not simply consent to international legal norms, but
lies in the need of individuals, whatever their stations in life, and
of whole sociopolitical entities to square their actions with their
See id. at 49-56 (discussing natural law and positivism).
a See id. at 50-54 (discussing positivist theory that international law is sum of rules to
which states have consented).
' See id. at 56 (discussing sources of modern international law).
7
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moral beliefs. If these individuals believe in God, the basis of obligation for just war doctrine is the necessity of justifying recourse to
war and the conduct of war to God. For believers, hypocritical exploitation or manipulation of just war doctrine-something that is
obviously quite possible-is unthinkable.
II.

JUST WAR DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW

Just war doctrine was essentially a product of Catholic scholarship and practice until the Reformation. Originating with Saint
Augustine, it was developed by the Scholastics and canonists, notably Saint Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Vittoria, and Francisco
Suarez.10 As it developed, classic just war doctrine was a blend of
Catholic theology, canon law and natural law political and social
theory, augmented by the customary practices of belligerents, particularly in the Age of Chivalry.1 ' Just war doctrine languished as
the modern international system developed and as various positivist philosophies prevailed over natural law approaches. However,
the horrors of two World Wars, the Holocaust, the advent of the
nuclear age, and the endless revolutionary/counterinsurgency wars
of the last half of the twentieth century have led to the revival of
just war doctrine. Rooted in both theology and philosophy, this revival has been markedly ecumenical. The leaders in the development of modern just war doctrine have been Protestants such as
Paul Ramsey 2 and James Turner Johnson," Catholics such as Father John Courtney Murray, S.J.,1 4 Father J. Bryan Hehir,"5 and

the author,'6 and the Jewish humanist Michael Walzer. 17 In recent
years, just war doctrine has been increasingly employed by the
Catholic Church, notably in the American Catholic Bishops 1983
10ALFRED VANDERPOL, LA DOCTRINE SCOLASTIQUE
11 See JAMES T. JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND

DU DROIT DE GUERRE

(1919).
26-79 (1975)

THE LIMITATIONS OF WAR

(analyzing development of classic just war doctrine from theological and secular sources).
12

See, e.g., PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR (1968); PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRIS-

TIAN CONSCIENCE (1961) [hereinafter RAMSEY, CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE].
13

See, e.g., JAMES T. JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST (1984) [hereinafter JOHNSON,

MODERN WAR]; JOHNSON, supra note 11; JAMES T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
RESTRAINT OF WAR (1981).

"4See

JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 249-73 (1960) (chapter entitled "The

Uses of a Doctrine on the Uses of Force").
16

See J. Bryan Hehir, Ethics and Strategy: The Views of Selected Strategists, in ETH-

ICS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (Todd Whitmore ed., 1989).
10 See O'BRIEN, supra note 1; WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, LAW AND MORALITY IN ISRAEL'S WAR
WITH THE

PLO (1991).

11 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
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pastoral, The Challenge of Peace.'" Accordingly, modern just war
doctrine can be viewed as having a theological base, or it can recommend itself simply on the basis of its plausibility and practicality as philosophical ethics or as common-sense public policy
guidance.
Just war doctrine is based on several assumptions. It assumes
that human beings are by nature social and political, and that they
thus require political society to lead a good life.' 9 It assumes,
therefore, that political society is a good in itself, a good worthy of
defense. Accordingly, just war recognizes a natural right of selfdefense, which is not merely a right to defend the members of the
political society but a right to defend the political society itself.
Nonetheless, just war doctrine recognizes that self-defense requires killing, injuring, and destroying. A moral presumption exists
against these actions which must be overcome for a war to be
deemed just.20 The requirements of just war doctrine constitute
the conditions for overcoming the presumption against war.
Just war doctrine, like the international law of war, is divided
into two categories. The first is war-decision law, traditionally
known as the jus ad bellum, which sets the requirements that
must be met to overcome the presumption against recourse to war.
The second is war-conduct law, or jus in bello, which regulates the
conduct of war.
The just war jus ad bellum requires that the just belligerent
have recourse to war under "competent authority" for a "just
cause" and that the just belligerent show "right intention." For the
just belligerent to show "just cause," several inquiries must be
made. First, the substance of the cause must be just. Second, the
just belligerent must possess comparative justice vis & vis the adversary. Third, in light of the probability of success, the means to
be employed and the expected damage must be proportionate to
the good to be achieved by the accomplishment of the just cause.
18

See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S

PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE
"

See

HEINRICH

A.

(1983) [hereinafter
THE STATE IN

ROMMEN,

2 NATIONAL CONFERENCE,

NATIONAL CONFERENCE].
CATHOLIC THOUGHT

220-29 (1945).

supra note 18, at 22-26 (promoting notion that just war rea-

soning begins with presumption against violence). But see Jeffrey Stout, Justice and Resort
to War: A Sampling of ChristianEthical Thinking, in CROSS, CRESCENT AND SWORD 3, 1519 (James T. Johnson & John Kelsay eds., 1990). Stout advocates a reformulation of the just
war presumption against violence. Id. Specifically, he suggests that an unjust act of violence
is forbidden, rather than a justified act of violence being an exception to the presumption
against violence. Id.
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Finally, reasonable peaceful alternatives must have been
exhausted.
The just war jus in bello requires that the just belligerent respect the principles of proportion and discrimination or non-combatant immunity, as well as the positive international laws of war,
in the conduct of the war. The meaning of these just war conditions will be explored in my subsequent analysis of Desert Storm.
All of the just war conditions must be substantially satisfied.
But no war, however justified, is likely to meet these conditions in
every respect. A just war analysis must weigh the extent to which
the conditions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello have been met and
must judge the moral permissibility of the war for the putatively
just belligerent. It should be emphasized that, contrary to some
formulations in classical just war doctrine, modern just war tends
not to emphasize that a belligerent is "just" so much as "justified."
"Morally permissible war" would be a better rubric, but "just war
doctrine" or "tradition" is so firmly established in moral discourse
that it remains the dominant term.2 1
It is important to understand that just war doctrine differs
fundamentally from various forms of holy war.2 2 Holy war, whether
in religious versions such as in the Christian religious wars23 or in
some applications of Muslim concepts of jihad24 or in some contemporary secular versions of the broad concept of wars of national
liberation, tends to deprecate or even reject the limitations of any
war-conduct law. Holy war doctrinists tend to justify all means in
service of the putatively just cause. Moreover, just war doctrine
and religious holy war doctrines differ with respect to the relation
21 See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 14. "Permissible war conveys the basic thought that
recourse to war is an exceptional prerogative that has to be justified, not a right readily
available to those who consider themselves just." Id.
22 But see JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 9-11. Johnson believes that classic just war doctrine is consistent with holy war doctrine. A separate holy war doctrine arises where religion
is the most just cause to validate a war. Id. at 11. Moreover, holy war doctrine complements
modern just war doctrine, which allows only natural law justification for war. Id.
23 See generally David Little, "Holy War" Appeals and Western Christianity:A Reconsiderationof Bainton's Approach, in JUST WAR AND JHAD 121 (John Kelsay & James T.
Johnson eds., 1991) (discussing pacifism, just war, and religious crusade as three Christian
attitudes toward use of force).
24 See generally Bruce Lawrence, Holy War (Jihad)in Islamic Religion and NationState Ideologies, in JUST WAR AND JIHAD, supra note 23, at 141 (discussing examples of
jihad); Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History, in CROSS, CRESCENT AND SWORD, supra note 20, at 35 (discussing development of jihad
and its moral and religious justifications).
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of the belligerents to God. Holy war doctrines tend to extend divine mandates to the faithful, to treat them as direct instruments
of God. Just war doctrine, particularly in its modern formulations,
does not claim any divine mandate. It simply holds itself out as a
guide to those who would justify their actions before God.
III.
A.

DESERT STORM: WAR DECISION LAW

(Jus ad Bellum)

Competent Authority

The just war condition of competent authority requires that
public force be employed under the authority of officials who have
the legal right to commit their State to war. (In this case it is unnecessary to grapple with the difficult question of evaluating
claims to competent authority by leaders of revolutionary movements.)2 5 In the case of Desert Storm, President George Bush had
competent authority from two sources: the Constitution of the
United States and the Charter of the United Nations as implemented by the Security Council.
President Bush deployed U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area
on August 7, 1990, following the invasion, conquest, and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990.26 He did so by virtue of
his powers as Commander-in-Chief under article II, section 2 of
the Constitution. These powers have been broadly interpreted
and applied by presidents such as Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and
George Bush himself.2 These broad interpretations of Article II
25 See O'BRIEN,

supra note 1, at 158-62.

28 See Molly Moore & Patrick J. Tyler, Crisis in the Gulf; Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait-U.S.Sends Troops, Jets to Saudi Arabia as Iraqi Forces Pose "Imminent Threat",
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al (describing President Bush's August 7 initial deployment of
2300 troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia); Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Force Invades Kuwait;
Tanks, Troops Storm Capital,WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al (noting White House statements calling for immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States"). But see
Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1991, at
84 (arguing that Bush administration, by engaging in Gulf War, circumvented Constitution's
mandate for congressional declaration of war).
28 See EDWIN S. CORBIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 275-318 (3d ed. rev. 1948)

(tracing expansion of presidential powers as Commander-in-Chief from Lincoln through
Truman); DAVID L. HALL, THE REAGAN WARs 135-233 (1991) (analyzing uses of force by
President Reagan); ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWER ACT 8-35 (1991) (discussing relations between president and Congress during Korean and Vietnam Wars).
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powers have often evoked congressional protests on the grounds
that they infringe on the power of Congress to declare war under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 29 In 1973, Congress enacted
the War Powers Resolution in an attempt to regain control over
the commitment of U.S. forces to wars and/or to areas where hostilities threatened."0 In practice, presidents since 1973 have generally declined to comply fully with the requirements of the War
Powers Resolution, claiming that its constitutionality is questionable in that it encroaches on the president's rights and duties as
Commander-in-Chief. 3L Neither the Congress nor the Executive,
however, has seemed anxious for a constitutional confrontation in
the courts. As a result, presidents have gone to some lengths to
advise the congressional leadership and report to the Congress regarding their decisions to commit U.S. armed forces; moreover,
they have elicited congressional support for such decisions without
conceding that such support must take the form of formal authorizations, including declarations of war. 2
In the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, President Bush committed U.S. forces for two initial purposes: to enforce a naval blockade
against Iraq and to build up a force to defend Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States from further Iraqi aggression. 3 Bush made these
commitments under his powers as Commander-in-Chief. His ac29 U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl.11 ("The Congress shall have Power... To declare War...

.11).

so50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988). The legislative history states that the purpose of the
resolution is to "restore the balance provided for and mandated by the Constitution." H.R.
REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2349. For
an examination of U.S. practice regarding the 1973 War Power Resolution, see generally,
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 260-80
(3d ed. rev. 1991); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 87-122 (1990); ROBERT
F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1983).
31 See GLENNON, supra note 30, at 88 nn.83-84. Glennon discusses the grounds for President Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution, notes the Reagan administration's objections to the resolution, and asserts that the Resolution is, in fact, constitutional. Id; see also
Caspar W. Weinberger, Dangerous Constraintson the President's War Power, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY 95-101 (Gordon Crowvitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (discussing
unconstitutionality of Resolution and dangerous effects on United States foreign policy).
11 See TURNER, supra note 28, at 121-27 (discussing compliance with Resolution by
Ford administration in Mayaguez rescue, by Carter Administration in Iran hostage rescue
attempt, and by Reagan Administration in Grenada and Libya).
" See Confrontationin the Gulf; Excerpts from Bush's Statement on U.S. Defense of
Saudis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A15 (President Bush citing reasons for initial deployment of forces).
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tions appeared to elicit wide Congressional and public support.3 4
However, on November 8, 1990, President Bush ordered approximately 200,000 troops to reinforce U.S. forces already in the
Gulf area, bringing the American deployment to approximately
430,000 troops3 5 -an "offensive military option." 6 Bush's move
prompted criticism from congressional Democrats"7 and activated a
debate on the wisdom of taking the offensive against Iraq that
culminated in the congressional debates on a Joint Resolution supporting the President in January 1991.18 On January 12, 1991,
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution. 9 The Resolution took*effect on January
14, 1991, when it was signed by the President, and it authorized
use of force "pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. " 40
Clearly, President Bush's unprecedented success in gaining
formal Security Council support for enforcemeit actions against
Iraq, both in terms of legal mandates and commitment of armed
forces and vital support, was critical to winning the formal support
of the Congress. Under U.S. leadership, the Security Council
passed a series of resolutions that constituted the first 41 clear Article 42 enforcement in the history of the United Nations.42 Security
"4See David Hoffman & Gwen Ifll, Bush Wins Support on Hill; Mideast Mission Has
Lawmakers Anxious, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29, 1990, at Al (reporting bipartisan support for
deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia).
"I See Ann Devroy, Bush Orders 200,000 More Troops to Gulf, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9,
1990, at Al.
:1 Id. (quoting President Bush).
'1 See Michael Weiskopf, Democrats Criticize Gulf Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1990,

at Al (noting warning by Democratic leaders that congressional approval was necessary to
commit American forces to hostilities).
'8 See Debates on Authorizing Use of U.S. Armed Forces Pursuantto U.N. Security
Council Resolution, 137 CONG. REC. S369 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991); see also, John E. Yang,

Somber Decision; At End of Emotional Debates, Votes Cast Without Enthusiasm, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 13, 1991, at Al (describing final day of debates and noting that House debate was
longest in history).
" Pub. L. No. 102-01, 105 Stat. 3 (1991)
[hereinafter Authorization of Force
Resolution].
40 Id. § 2(a).
41 The Korean "police action" should not be considered a Security Council enforcement
action. It was an article 51 collective self-defense action, see U.N. CHARTER art. 51, organized under the banner of the United Nations by the General Assembly's "Uniting for Peace
Resolution" of November 3, 1950. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/1481 (1950). See generally ALF Ross, THE UNITED NATIONS: PEACE AND PROGRESS 44-45
42 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.

(1966) (discussing Uniting for Peace Resolution).
Article 42 provides the following:
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Council Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, the first of these resolutions, condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded its
withdrawal. 43 Resolution 660 was followed by other resolutions
that addressed the potential for recourse to armed force. Specifically, Resolution 665 established an economic embargo against
45
Iraq; 44 Resolution 670 expanded the embargo to include air traffic
and authorized detention of Iraqi ships used to break the embargo; 46 and Resolution 678 authorized U.N. members to use "all
means necessary" to enforce the previous resolutions and set a
deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply. 47 Accordingly,
when Iraq refused to comply, President Bush was able to request
congressional support for U.S. leadership in carrying out an article
42 Security Council enforcement action against an aggressor.4 s
I conclude that the combination of the President's powers as
Commander-in-Chief, strengthened by the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, combined with the SeShould the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved inadequate, it may take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Id. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter allows the Security Council to take actions "not involving
the use of armed force" to give effect to its decisions. Id. But see Oscar Schachter, United
Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 457-61 (1991) (arguing that Security Council can best be viewed as having operated under U.N. Charter article 51, which
provides for "collective self defense"); Burns H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in International
and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision Making: PrecariousLegitimacy, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991) (asserting that authorization of use of force against Iraq was not made in accordance with U.N. Charter).
"' S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), reprinted
in 29 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1323, 1325 (1990).
"' S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), reprintedin 29 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1329 (1990). Paragraph 1 authorized a maritime blockade of Iraq, in furtherance
of economic sanctions. Id.
"' S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 2943d mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted

in 29

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

1334 (1990).

Id.
47 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted
in 29 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1565 (1990).
48 Others suggest that article 51 was the basis of the enforcement action. See Schachter,
supra note 42, at 457-62 (noting that Security Council Resolution 678 did not declare which
article of the U.N. Charter provided authority and asserting that competent authority most
likely existed under article 51, collective self-defense). The Authorization of Force Resolution also fails to cite its source of authority; it should be noted, however, that the preamble
to the U.N. Charter refers to Security Council affirmation of the right of "individual or
collective self-defense . . . in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."
Authorization of Force Resolution, supra note 39.
46
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curity Council resolutions on the Gulf crisis, particularly resolutions 665 and 678, gave President Bush the strongest claim to competent authority to employ armed force of any American president
since Franklin Roosevelt.
B.

Just Cause

I will include within the broad category of Just Cause the following: the substance of the cause, the comparative justice of the
adversaries, the proportionality of contemplated means to the just
ends, and the exhaustion of peaceful remedies for the putative just
party.
1.

Substance of the Cause

The substance of the cause of the United States and its coalition partners is authoritatively stated in the Department of Defense's July 1991 Interim Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict:
Stating on August 5th [1990] that "this shall not stand",
President Bush framed US national policy objectives:
* Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi
forces from Kuwait;
* Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
* Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf;
and
* Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.49
These objectives clearly constituted several just causes: recovery of Kuwait, the victim of unjust and unlawful aggression; defense of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States against the clear and
present danger of further Iraqi aggression; restoration of security
and stability to the Gulf area, vital for the world's economy and to
peace in the region; and protection of American nationals denied
fundamental human rights by the Iraqi regime.5 0

'9

U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS (1991) [hereinafter DOD INTERIM REPORT]. This report was prepared
pursuant to title V of the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-25, 105 Stat. 75, 103. Section 501 (b)(1) of this Act directs the
Department of Defense to include in its report "[t]he military objectives of the multinational coalition." Id. § 501(b)(1).
60 See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 20. An adequate basis for evaluating the substance of
the cause requires that the it be "sufficiently 'serious and weighty' to overcome the presumption against killing in general and war in particular." Id. (quoting James F. Childress,

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
2.

[Vol. 66:797

Comparative Justice

Evaluating the comparative .justiceof the parties to the conflict is a complex matter. 51 In the long period of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, it was not difficult to conclude that the
comparative justice of the NATO countries far exceeded that of
the Warsaw Pact countries.5 2 Successful aggression by the Warsaw
Pact would have meant subjugation to some of the most democratic, rule-of-law countries by oppressive totalitarian dictatorships. Similarly, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States do not
compare well with the NATO countries in terms of comparative
justice. They are undemocratic, authoritarian states with serious
shortcomings insofar as human rights are concerned. Nonetheless,
these Middle East countries have been relatively stable, prosperous, and able to maintain large numbers of foreign workers in conditions more favorable than those that foreign workers may have
found in their countries of origin. Iraq, on the other hand, has suffered from an extremely violent form of totalitarian regime. Minorities and dissidents have not been merely disadvantaged in Iraq,
but persecuted, sometimes by genocidal measures as in the case of
the Kurds.5 3 Even before the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, one could
have predicted an Iraqi occupation of that or any other country
would be extremely harsh and repressive. In the months between
the August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the beginning of the U.S./U.N. coalition resort to force,5 4 there had been
abundant evidence that Saddam Hussein's forces were destroying
Just-War Criteria, in WAR OR PEACE: THE SEARCH FOR NEW ANSWERS 39, 46 (Thomas H.
Shannon ed., 1980)). Such causes include 1) "'to protect the innocent from unjust attack,'
2) 'to restore rights wrongfully denied,' [and] 3) to re-establish a just order.'" Id.
5 See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 20-24. Modern analysts often neglect the question of
comparative justice. Id. at 21. The analysis of this element requires comparison of the politics or political-social systems of the opponents in the war. Id. at 20. "One must ask whether
the political-social order of ...
[the putatively just belligerent] is sufficiently valuable to
warrant its defense in a war against [the adversary], which, if victorious, would impose its
[own] political-social order." Id.
62 See id. at 20-22 (analyzing comparative justice between United States and former
Soviet Union).
53 See, e.g., MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ (1990) (reporting human
rights violations under regime of Saddam Hussein); Julie Johnson, U.S. Asserts Iraq Used
Poison Gas Against Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al (detailing State Department
allegations of use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Kurdish guerrillas).
" See Rick Atkinson & David Broder, U.S., Allies Launch Massive Air War Against
Targets in Iraq and Kuwait, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al (detailing January 16, 1991
commencement of air war by United States, British, Saudi, and Kuwaiti forces).
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Kuwait as a social, political, and economic entity.5 5 Comparative
justice required that Kuwait be freed from this kind of occupation
and that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States be freed from the specter of suffering Kuwait's fate.
This discussion highlights an important aspect of just War reasoning. Given the fact that the vast majority of states in the international system fall far short of the standards of comparative justice that are realized in the advanced democracies, it will often be
the case that victims of aggression and inhuman treatment do not
themselves rank high in terms of democratic institutions, the rule
of law, and human rights protections. This lack of comparative justice in the victim states should not mean, however, that these
countries should be denied protection against aggression. There is
a difference in comparative justice between a state like contemporary Iraq-where the ruling regime has displayed utter contempt
for human rights and has flouted international conventions against
chemical warfare-and states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
which, while susceptible to criticism for human rights violations
and other political failings, are recognizably more civilized. This
difference is so great that no reasonable effort should be spared to
prevent the spread by force and terror of countries such as Iraq.
3.

Proportionality

The next issue to be addressed in the just cause analysis is
whether, in addition to just causes and comparative justice, the
U.S./U.N. coalition operation had a probability of success that
warranted the use of the extreme means of war with the prospect
of a proportionate cost for the realization of the just ends. This
question is the heart of the just war analysis. All of the just war
conditions are important and must be met. However, the most difficult is usually the requirement that the probability of success be
so substantial as to assure that the cost of the war and the damage
done on all sides will be proportionate to the good to be accomplished by the putatively just war. Indeed, it is not sufficiently recognized in the just war literature that this requirement may necessitate repeated judgments about this central point subsequent to

11 See Human Rights Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq: HearingBefore the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1991) (statement of John G. Healey, Executive
Director, Amnesty International USA detailing reports of Kuwaitis tortured, raped, and executed by Iraqi forces).
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the initial decision." What may look feasible as the proportionate
cost at the outset of a war may prove to be too uncertain of success
and/or too costly in the course of the war. Once the proportionate
cost outweighs the potential good, a war should be terminated on
the best achievable terms, irrespective of the apparent justice and
desirability of the just cause.
The decisions leading to the initiation of hostilities with Iraq
in January 1991 were difficult. The most conspicuous problem was
that of judging whether economic and other sanctions falling short
of armed conflict offered a reasonable alternative to full-scale war.
This problem will be discussed below in connection with the requirement that alternatives to armed force be reasonably exhausted. 57 However, assuming that full recourse to the military instrument might be necessary, U.S./U.N. coalition decision-makers
had to evaluate Iraq's military capabilities and the chances of overcoming them at an acceptable cost within a reasonable time. This
calculation is difficult in most situations where war is contemplated, and it was particularly difficult in the months prior to the
January 1991 hostilities.
Iraq had a large army that possessed large numbers of modern
Soviet-made tanks, artillery, and other equipment.5" It was an
army that had fought a long war with Iran. Although the offensive
potential of the Iraqi army was considered limited, it seemed to
present a formidable defensive posture. The Iraqi forces were dug
in, in Kuwait, and their considerable engineering capabilities had
constructed impressive defense fortifications.5 9 To be sure, it was
apparent that the Iraqi air force would be unable to compete for
long with the U.S./U.N. coalition air power. But, casting an ominous pall over the whole situation was the threat of Iraqi chemical
warfare. The Iraqis had used chemical warfare against the Iranians
and against their own Kurds6 0 The chemical warfare threat affected virtually all aspects of U.S./U.N. coalition planning and op66

See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 27.

'

See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.

'8

See R. Jeffrey Smith, Some Nations Now Condemning Saddam Had Helped Arm

Him, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1990, at A14 (characterizing Iraq as world's largest importer of

arms, with over 5500 tanks, 3500 artillery pieces, and 513 combat aircraft).
"' See Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 674-75 (1990)
(statement of General Colin L. Powell, U.S.A., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, assessing
Iraqi military threat as of Dec. 3, 1990).
60

See supra note 53.
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erations. Use of gas masks, protective clothing, and medication
hindered the troops in all echelons. Iraq's capabilities to employ
SCUD missiles, particularly against civilian targets, and the possibility that chemical warfare agents might be delivered by these
missiles caused' great apprehension and led to the Israeli ordeal in
Tel Aviv and Haifa, which were eventual targets of indiscriminate
Iraqi missile attacks. 1
There was never any question whether the U.S./U.N. coalition
forces could eventually defeat Iraqi forces. Rather, the question
turned on whether victory could be achieved at an acceptable cost
within a reasonable time. It is important to recall that reasonable
people differed over whether a war with Iraq could be won at proportionate cost. Prominent military figures and politicians, competent in security questions, argued against war.6 2 The issue was debated throughout the fall of 1990 and in the congressional debates
in January 1991.63 In the end, President Bush received a congressional mandate to join with his U.N. Security Council warrant to
pursue the just causes with armed force. 4
Clearly, the key to this decision was the trust placed in air
superiority. The air war, launched on January 16-17, 1991, completely eliminated the Iraqi air force and wrecked the infrastructure of Iraq's armed forces and military-industrial complex.6 5 The
air war accomplished two vital objectives: it devastated the Iraqi
forces and their defenses, and it left them blind. When the ground
war began, the defenses that had looked so formidable fell rapidly,
and the Iraqis' inability to see the enemy until it was too late led
to unprecedented strategic and tactical ground successes by the
U.S./U.N. coalition forces.
It should be noted that the air war gave the U.S./U.N. coalition forces opportunities to reassess periodically the overall
"1See

Joel Brinkley, War in the Gulf: Israel;Israelis Report Limited Damage, N.Y.

TiMES, Jan. 18, 1991, at Al (describing Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa).
62 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 337-39, 342 (1991) (describing November 30, 1990 meeting between President Bush and congressional leaders immediately prior
to commencement of hostilities with Iraq and noting statement by General Colin Powell
regarding effectiveness of economic sanctions); Michael R. Gordon, Mideast Tensions; 2 ExMilitary Chiefs Urge Bush to Delay Gulf War, N.Y. Tras, Nov. 29, 1990, at Al (quoting
statements by Admiral William J. Crowe and General David Jones before Senate Armed
Services Committee that 12 to 18 months of sanctions against Iraq would be less costly than
war).
6' See supra note 39.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
05 See supra note 54.
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probability of success and the specific probability of success of a
ground war. Political and military decision-makers could judge
"how much was enough" of the air war before a ground war with
good prospects for success at proportionate cost should be
launched. In the event, the timing of the air and ground wars
proved to be incredibly good, and the cost to the U.S./U.N. coalition forces far less than anticipated. Whether the cost to the Iraqis
was proportionate is another question to be addressed in the discussion of war-conduct. 6
Beyond the calculus of proportionality in the light of
probability of success in terms of the immediate effects of the war
in the combat zone there loomed still another issue. This was the
question of the possible effects on the Islamic world of a war
against Iraq, led by the United States and erstwhile colonial powers such as Britain and France, and possibly involving Israel at
some point. Throughout the period from August 1990 to January
1991, some predicted that war with Iraq would be seen as an imperialist war fought by the United States, its European allies, and, in
effect, Arab "stooges." It was also said that Saddam Hussein would
be seen, whatever the outcome of such a war, as a heroic Arab
Muslim standing up against the imperialists and the Arab regimes
that had betrayed both Islam and the Arab masses.17 Such sentiments were particularly heard in Jordan, where they were featured
on American television."' American and other Arabist scholars
warned that war with Iraq might ignite Muslim revolts in Arab
states siding with the U.S./U.N. coalition.6
If taken seriously, these predictions presented a no-win situation to Bush and his allies. If Saddam Hussein were left unchallenged, palpable threats to the peace and security of the Middle
East and to the world's oil supply would remain and perhaps grow
worse. However, if Saddam were effectively defeated and thwarted,

" See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., Fouad Ajami, The Summer of Arab Discontent, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter
1990/91, at 1 (discussing Saddam Hussein's appeal to Arab resentment toward West and
desire for Arab unity); Youssef M. Ibrahim, The Split Among Arabs Unleashes a People's
Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, § 4, at 1 (discussing pro-Iraqi sentiments among Arabs).
'8 See Stanley Reed, Jordanand the Gulf Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1990/91, at
21 (discussing Jordanian support for Iraq during Gulf War).
619See Crisis in the PersianGulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess. 410, 412-13 (1990)
(statement of Dr. Phebe Marr, Middle East historian and specialist on Iraq, assessing threat
of Islamic movements to United States operation in Gulf).
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the repercussions in the Muslim world, particularly in states
friendly to the United States and the West, might be severe.
Although in retrospect the issue of Muslim extremist reactions
to a war with Iraq appears to have been exaggerated, it was an all
too real problem for those attempting to determine the probability
of success (What would constitute a "success?") and proportionality of such a war, even if the causes were just. Moreover, concern
over reactions in the Muslim world appear to have affected the decision to terminate hostilities. This will be discussed in connection
with the requirement of right intention."
4. Exhaustion of Peaceful Remedies
Was there a reasonable exhaustion of peaceful remedies
before resort to war in the Gulf? Before addressing this question it
is important to emphasize the difference between this formulation
of a just war requirement and the more frequently employed term
' 71 The interpretation
"last resort."
of this requirement offered in
this Article eschews the term "last resort," which implies a desperate, at-the-last-possible-moment use of force in immediate self-defense. However, aggression and subsequent subjugation may not
take forms comparable to, for example, the kind of clear and present threat to life that warrants the use of deadly force in selfdefense in domestic law. If Saddam Hussein's forces had continued
on from Kuwait and invaded Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States,
resort to war by the U.S./U.N. coalition forces would clearly have
been a "last resort." But in international relations threats to peace
and human rights can take place over a temporal continuum. During the passage of time, such threats can be identified as substantial, engendering rights and duties of deterrence and defense
against them. A better term than "last resort" is "reasonable exhaustion of peaceful remedies."
Two interrelated courses of action taken against Iraq's aggression might be examined under the rubric "reasonable exhaustion
of peaceful remedies." However, only one of these actions was entirely "peaceful." Diplomatic efforts to achieve the just ends
sought by the U.S./U.N. coalition were entirely peaceful. These included diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation as well as coercive
71See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., JOHNSON, MODERN WAR, supra note 13, at 24-25;

71

supra note 18, at 30.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE,
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diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq by U.N. Security Council resolutions and by interruption of political and economic relations with
that country. The other action taken, economic sanctions, was not
entirely peaceful. In part these sanctions, freezing of assets and economic non-intercourse, were peaceful. 2 However, the sea and air
blockades established under Security Council Resolutions 665 and
670 involved the use of armed force to interdict traffic to and from
Iraq. 75 Had Iraq or others resisted the blockades, acts of war would
have followed. Accordingly, those who argued for prolonged reliance on sanctions in lieu of all-out war were arguing for limited
war, not "peaceful" means.
The diplomatic "peaceful means" were exhausted. Iraq had
the opportunities to argue its case in the Security Council. A lastditch effort by U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Geneva, encompassing talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, ended on
January 9, 1991 with Baker reporting: "Regrettably . . . I heard
nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatever. '74 Aziz
had attempted to demand that the Kuwait issue be joined with the
Arab-Israeli conflict and threatened that Iraq would "absolutely"
attack Israel if the multinational forces attacked Iraq. 75 U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar's attempts to negotiate with
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad ended on January 13, 1991 with De
Cuellar's statement, "only God knows" if there will be war and
with Saddam Hussein's reaffirmation of his determination to hold
on to Kuwait, which Iraq had designated an Iraqi province.7 6
These two last-minute efforts to discover even a hint that the
just objectives of the United States and the United Nations might
be achieved by peaceful means should be viewed in the light of the
underlying fact of Iraqi intransigence from August 2, 1990 to January 15, 1991. A period of more than five months, during which Kuwait was being ravaged in every sense by the Iraqi occupation, was
certainly a "reasonable" time in which to obtain by peaceful means
72

See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933d mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), re-

printed in 29

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

1325, 1326 (1990). Paragraph 3 orders the states to

prevent commercial dealing with Iraq or Kuwait; paragraph 4 orders all Iraqi assets to be
frozen. Id. at 1-2.
73 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
74 David Hoffman,
U.S.-Iraqi Talks Fail to Break Gulf Stalemate; Aziz Says War
Would Bring Attack on Israel, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al.
75

Id.

Tod Robberson, U.N. Leader Says "Only God Knows" If War Lies Ahead", WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 1991, at Al.
7'
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some glimmer of hope that the U.S./U.N. objectives might be
achieved.
With respect to the position that these objectives might have
been achieved by maintenance of the blockade and other sanctions,
it appears clear by now that only overt armed force was sufficient
to remove Iraq from Kuwait and to extinguish the broader threat
to the entire region. Despite the continuation of the sanctions even
after the termination of the fighting, Saddam Hussein still retains
power and defies the world. He apparently places no limit on the
suffering that his people must bear because of his policies, and
they seem unable to influence, much less displace him. It hardly
needs to be added that long-term sanctions are difficult to maintain, particularly those of the scale placed on Iraq. In retrospect,
the argument for relying on sanctions appears to have been more
an argument to avoid full-scale war at any price rather than an
argument for the efficacy of sanctions. I conclude that there was a
reasonable exhaustion of peaceful remedies as well as of coercive
political-economic remedies in the Gulf crisis.
5.

Right Intention

Finally, the just war doctrine requires that the just belligerent
have right intention. Right intention includes several elements:
(1) restriction of the pursuit of the war to operations clearly
necessary to achieve the just cause;
(2) avoidance of a spirit of hatred and vengeance; and
(3) pursuit of war policies conducive to the ultimate realization of a just and lasting peace.
The U.S./U.N. coalition forces met all of the requirements of
right intention, except in the case of Kuwaiti behavior after liberation of Kuwait.?7 Conformity with the first element of right intention is underscored by continuing criticism of President Bush for
"not finishing the job," specifically, not subjugating Iraq entirely
and deposing Saddam Hussein. However, that objective was never
"the job" that had been mandated by the U.S. Congress and the
U.N. Security Council. "The job" was to liberate Kuwait and re7" See Don Oberdorfer, U.S. Rights Report Assails China's Practices; State Department, Citing Collapse of Communism, Sees Improvement in Global Conditions, WASH.
POST, Feb. 1, 1992, at A17. "Nonetheless, 'serious problems remained' in post-war Kuwait,
including mistreatment of prisoners, restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech and
curbs on the right of citizens to change their government. Women's rights were described as
'significantly limited.'" Id.
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store security and order in the region. The just objective was not to
conquer and occupy all of Iraq, to resolve all the complex issues of
self-determination of Kurdish and Iraqi Shi'a minorities, and to
depose and replace Saddam Hussein. Pursuit of these objectives
would have probably led to a quagmire of open-ended duration. It
would have meant a new war that would have required new legal
and moral warrants. Bush and his colleagues chose not to embark
on such a war. They stopped the fighting promptly when the just
objectives were achieved.
The second requirement of right intention was also well met.
To be sure, there was criticism of Bush for "demonizing" Saddam
Hussein. However, anyone following Saddam's actions and statements would rightly "demonize" the dictator without any prompting from President Bush. Official U.S./U.N. coalition statements
emphasized that the enemy was not the Iraqi people but the regime of Saddam Hussein. 78 It may be argued, and it will be discussed under war-conduct, that U.S./U.N. coalition forces inflicted
too much collateral damage on Iraqi society.7 9 Whatever the validity of such claims, no evidence exists that such damage was the
result of a spirit of hatred or vengeance; rather, it was the by-product of the military means employed.
Finally, the right intention objective of establishing a just and
lasting peace was promoted by the removal of the Iraqi security
threat to the region while permitting Iraq to remain sufficiently
united and strong to balance to some extent the power of Iran,
another major source of regional instability. In addition, the
United States took the lead in working for the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, the U.S./U.N. coalition forces provided humanitarian assistance and security to the Kurds, making
possible at least a minimal continued coexistence between them
and the regime of Saddam Hussein. That the obstacles to peace in
the Gulf area and in the Arab-Israeli conflict remain formidable, if
78 See George Bush, Address to American People (Jan. 16, 1991), in PresidentBush
Assures American People: "We Will Not Fail", WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1991, at A29. The
President stated,
We have no argument with the people of Iraq; indeed, for the innocents
caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq;
it is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can
even now convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait
and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

Id.

7' See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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not intractable, is not due to lack of right intention by the U.S./
U.N. coalition forces in the Gulf War.
IV.

DESERT STORM: WAR-CONDUCT LAW (Jus in

Bello)

The just war doctrine emphasizes two principles in its warconduct law: proportion and discrimination. Additionally, it enjoins adherence to the positive international law of war.
A.

Proportion

In the preceding discussion, it was stated that a war-decision
(jus ad bellum) principle of proportion requires an overall proportionality between the ends and means and the costs and benefits of
a war. This requirement might be termed "grand strategic" proportionality or, in classical political theory terminology, "raison
d'ftat." The war-conduct principle of proportion, however, applies
to the military ends and means, or what might be called the "strategic" and "tactical" levels. In classical political theory and international legal terminology, this kind of proportion is the core of
"raison de guerre" or "military necessity."
War-conduct proportionality, expressed in the principle of
military necessity, requires that a belligerent employ only those
kinds and degrees of armed coercion necessary to accomplish the
military missions. In addition, the principles of proportion in the
two parts of just war doctrine, war-decision and war-conduct law,
are related. Interpretations of proportionality at the strategic or
tactical level should not lead to actions at cross-purposes with the
calculus of proportionality at the grand strategic level of war-decision law. Even actions that can be justified in the field as necessary
and proportionate might contribute to patterns of belligerent behavior that ultimately frustrate efforts to keep the overall conduct
of the war proportionate to the just cause. This can easily be the
case in modern war wherein extremes of destructive firepower and
mobility may lead to excesses not desired or anticipated in the
war-decision calculus of overall proportionality of ends and means.
Much of the criticisms of U.S./U.N. coalition actions in the
Gulf War as disproportionate are intertwined with charges of excessive collateral damage in violation of the principle of discrimination or non-combatant immunity from direct intentional attack.
Because I interpret the principle of discrimination as prohibiting
disproportionatecollateral damage, I will address this criticism in
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the discussion of discrimination." In the discussion of proportionality that follows, I will consider the claim that some of the U.S./
U.N. coalition actions were not truly required by military necessity. This claim includes two forms of belligerent conduct: (1) the
air war generally and (2) the tactical air attacks on retreating Iraqi
troops at the end of the war.
Middle East Watch has published a volume criticizing conduct
of the Gulf War, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War.s1 This report
emphasizes, inter alia, the requirement that an attack causing collateral damage-damage to non-combatants and/or to civilian
targets-must be proportionate to the "'concrete and direct' military advantage" anticipated,8 2 language borrowed from article 51,
paragraph (5)(b) of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I ("Protocol I").83
Protocol I was signed by the United States but not submitted to
the Senate for advice on ratification. The Reagan and Bush administrations have supported the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
Protocol I contains provisions unacceptable to the United States.8 4
Nevertheless, it is fair to refer to the articles of Protocol I concerning proportionality, namely articles 51, paragraph (5)(b)8 5 and article 57, paragraph (2)(a)(iii) and (2)(b).8 6 Generally, these articles
are not at variance with the understanding of the customary principle of proportion as presented in U.S. military manuals and other
materials.8 7 Moreover, the Middle East Watch report is justified in
employing the most authoritative treatise interpreting Protocol I,
88 See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR 42 (1991).
Id. at 42.
83 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Annex III, at art. 51,
5(b), U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1391, 1413 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
84 See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 1987 PUB. PAP. 88, 88-89 (Jan. 29, 1987) (rejecting Protocol I, supra note 83,
because of, inter alia, its treatment of "wars of national liberation" as international
conflicts).
88 Protocol I, supra note 83, art. 51, 1 5(b).
81

82

88

Id. art. 57, V2(a)(iii), reprintedin 16 INT'L LEGAL

MATERIALS

1391, 1416 (1990). Arti-

cle 57, paragraph 2 requires those planning attacks to refrain from launching attacks that

might be expected to cause excessive civilian in relation to the military advantage anticipated. Id.
87 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET No. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL
LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS § 5-3(c)(2)(b),
U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 1

at 5-10 (1976);
41 (1956); U.S.

DEP'T OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 9 (REV. A) FMFM 1-10)
8.1.2q.1, at 8-5 (1989).
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Bothe, Partsch, and Solf's New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts."' These evidences of the positive international law of war are
consonant with the just war principle of proportion. However, I do
not share the conclusions of Middle East Watch concerning the
proportionality of U.S./U.N. coalition actions.
The essence of the Middle East Watch's claim that U.S./U.N.
coalition air attacks lacked proportionality is that too many of
them inflicted general, indirect, long-term damage on Iraq's infrastructure rather than damage producing "the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."" 9 Middle East Watch criticized
targeting of food, agricultural, and water-treatment facilities, the
crippling of the electrical system, and attacks on civilian vehicles
on highways as well as on Bedouin tents.90 A detailed point-bypoint analysis of these criticisms is beyond the scope of this article.
However, two comments may be made. First, Iraq was a nation
mobilized for war. Civilian rights and needs had been and continued to be completely subordinated to the requirements of Saddam
Hussein's government and armed forces. The U.S./U.N. coalition
forces aimed at a quick, massive destruction of everything that
made it possible for Saddam Hussein to wage war, without targeting civilians and civilian targets as such. This war-conduct strategy
was proportionate to the political-military goal of defeating Iraq
decisively and quickly. Second, there should be a practical presumption that belligerents such as the United States and its U.N.
coalition partners, which do not pursue deliberate countervalue
strategies against civilian targets as such, "anticipated" that "concrete and direct military damage" would result from the kinds of
attacks criticized by Middle East Watch.
This issue requires a more detailed analysis which should include substantial input from people with military experience. Such
expertise appears to be missing from the Middle East Watch's report on the Gulf War.
A second issue of proportionality has been raised with respect
to air attacks on retreating Iraqi troops on February 26-27, 1991.
With the war clearly won, was it necessary to continue these attacks? The U.S./U.N. coalition spokesman, General Richard I.
Neal, answered, "The war is not over.., and we're going to conMICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS

(1982).

e MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 81, at 43 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 8-14

(summarizing report's conclusions regarding proportionality of air attacks).
90 See id. at 149-230 (discussing report's criticisms on these points).
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tinue to attack and attack and attack."' Critics of these attacks
raise an issue seldom discussed by experts on the law of war,
namely, "What is the standard of proportionality for strictly
counterforce attacks on enemy forces?" I concur with the position
of General Neal, that as long as armed enemies are at large and
capable of causing damage, they are fair targets. An additional dimension of this issue was raised by the fact that the Iraqi soldiers
fleeing Kuwait were burdened with pillaged loot. They were not
"withdrawing," they were "retreating" with their loot.9 2 Moreover,
some of the retreating Iraqi soldiers subsequently demonstrated
their continued ability to cause damage by their brutal suppression
of the Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds. I conclude that the U.S./U.N. coalition forces met just war requirements of proportionality in their
conduct of the war.
B.

Discrimination

Just war doctrine prohibits direct intentional attacks on noncombatants and civilian targets.93 The majority of modern just war
scholars tend to treat this prohibition as an absolute.94 Because it
is difficult if not impossible to reconcile most forms of modern warfare fought in mixed military-civilian contexts with an absolute
principle of discrimination, the dilemma is usually resolved by recourse to the principle of double effect.9 5 Reliance on the principle
of double effect as a means of mitigating the rigor of an absolute
principle of discrimination is, however, unpersuasive. Instead, I
contend that the principle of discrimination is an important, but
not absolute, principle of just war doctrine. In order to interpret
this principle reasonably, it is necessary to evaluate the propor' Rick Atkinson & William Claiborne, Allies Surround Republic Guard, Say Crippled
Iraqis Are Near Defeat, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al.
9 See William Claiborne & Caryle Murphy, Retreat Down Highway of Doom, WASH.

POST, Mar. 1, 1991, at Al (describing Kuwaiti "loot" left along Iraqi retreat path).
11 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 34 (discussing problem of distinguish-

ing non-combatants and non-military targets from military targets); WALZER, supra note 17,
at 151-52.
"' See RAMSEY, supra note 12, at 152-57; WALZER, supra note 17, at 151-52; see also
O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 44-45 (discussing different positions taken on principle of
discrimination).
" See WALZER, supra note 17, at 151-59. In perhaps the most influential contemporary
just war work, Michael Walzer relies heavily on the principle of double effect, which he
defines as follows: "The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the
acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he
seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself." Id. at 155.
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tionality of civilian, countervalue damage to the military damage
and advantage required by legitimate military necessity. In practice, there may not be much difference between the double effect
approach of Walzer and the majority of just war scholars and my
proportionality approach. Both viewpoints recognize that civilian,
countervalue damage is virtually inevitable in most forms and circumstances of modern warfare and that the practical normative requirement is for belligerents to make every reasonable effort to
minimize that damage.
The close relation, then, of the war-conduct principles of proportion and discrimination is apparent. Belligerent action must
meet the requirement of true military necessity while satisfying the
requirement of discrimination that military measures not inflict
disproportionate damage on civilians and civilian targets.
Throughout Desert Storm and in the Defense Department's
Interim Report, the U.S. Government and military emphasized the
intention to respect the principle of discrimination. 6 Indeed, this
emphasis was in conspicuous contrast to official statements in earlier wars, notably World War II1 In the event, most U.S./U.N.
coalition actions were discriminatory. This was partly the result of
the fact that most of the ground war fighting took place in the
desert without the complication of civilians in the combat areas.
Adherence to discrimination was also enhanced by complete air superiority and the capabilities of modern air-craft and ordinance.
Indeed, the critical report of Middle East Watch acknowledges
that "in many if not most respects the allies' conduct was consistent with their stated intent to take all feasible precautions to
avoid civilian casualties."'98 Middle East Watch was reacting to the
United States' claim of "a near perfect war, with as little harm to
civilian life and property as humanly possible."99
It is not possible within the scope of this Article to review
Middle East Watch's criticisms of U.S./U.N. coalition conduct of
the war as it affected civilians and civilian targets. However, if
Middle East Watch's report may be taken as a starting point for
just war analysis, it can be concluded that the U.S./U.N. coalition
forces did meet the overall requirement of discrimination. Obviously, there will always be violations of the principle of discrimina01 See DOD INTERIm REPORT, supra note 49, at i-2, 1-4, 2-6 to 2-7, 12-1 to 12-4.
97 See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 78-87 (analyzing war conduct during World War II).
"a MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 81, at 4.
I' Id. at 1.
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tion in a war, unless it is conducted entirely in a remote arena bare
of civilians and civilian targets. The issue for just war analysis is
whether the general pattern of belligerent behavior conforms to
the principle of discrimination. This analysis involves the evaluation of belligerent policy statements, preparations, strategies, rules
of engagement, explicit invocation of the laws of war, and the actual conduct of operations. Based on available evidence, it is clear
that the U.S./U.N. coalition forces intended to and did observe the
principle of discrimination to a greater degree than any belligerents in major contemporary wars. That they may not and should
have tried to do even better may be conceded without vitiating this
judgment. Moreover, it should be remembered that there were no
purely countervalue attacks on civilian targets as such despite
Iraq's provocative and indiscriminate attacks on Israel and Saudi
Arabia.
Otherwise, U.S./U.N. coalition observance of the positive laws
of war was outstanding. Treatment of prisoners of war and humanitarian assistance to civilians fully met the requirements of the
law. 10 0 Of particular note is the fact that even before the start of
hostilities, the United States renounced the use of chemical and
biological and nuclear "weapons of mass destruction," even in retaliation for their use by Iraq.'10
V.

CONCLUSION

A just war analysis must weigh the record of observance to all
of the just war conditions. Often this is a difficult task because observance may be uneven. For example, the justice of the cause may
be clear, but the proportionality of the means in the light of
probability of success may be unclear. Even if all of the war-decision (jus ad bellum) conditions appear to be met satisfactorily,
egregious violations of the war-conduct (jus in bello) principles
and rules may render an otherwise just war unjust.
In the case of Desert Storm, all of the just war requirements
were clearly met. There was competent authority based on an uno10
See DOD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 49, question 12, at 12-1 to 12-9.
Jeffrey Smith & Rick Atkinson, U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use of Nuclear, Chemical
Arms, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1991, at Al (citing military and administration officials who asserted that coalition would not use nuclear or chemical weapons in any event against Iraq);
see also McGeorge Bundy, Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1991, at
83 (discussing reasons for and ramifications of United States' decision not to use nuclear
weapons against Iraq).
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precedented collective security enforcement mandate of the U.N.
Security Council. The cause of liberation of Kuwait and removal of
an extreme threat to the peace was just. Comparative justice was
on the U.S./U.N. coalition side. There was a probability of success
and prospects for proportionality between achievement of the just
causes and the cost of the war. There was a reasonable exhaustion
of peaceful remedies both through diplomacy and unprecedented
virtually world-wide applications of political and economic sanctions. Right intention was demonstrated by the prompt termination of hostilities and the efforts to establish a new peace process
in the region. The principles of proportion and discrimination were
honored in the conduct of the war to an exceptional degree. The
laws of war and the injunctions of humanitarian law were observed. Desert Storm was a just war.

